Toxic Torts and Mass Torts by Rosenthal, Brent M. et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 25
2006




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brent M. Rosenthal, et al., Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 59 SMU L. Rev. 1579 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol59/iss3/25




OXIC torts and mass torts present distinct challenges for the judi-
cial system. Because toxic-tort cases frequently involve latent in-
juries, complex and cutting-edge theories of causation, and an
abundance of alleged tortfeasors, traditional legal concepts must often be
tweaked, modified, or reconfigured to produce just and acceptable re-
sults. Mass torts, defined simply as litigation involving many claims of
injury allegedly caused by the same product or tortious conduct, present
obvious but novel case-management problems.
Having established many of the major ground rules applicable in these
relatively new areas of litigation in prior years, the Texas appellate courts
did not plow much new ground during the Survey period but largely ap-
plied those rules to new fact patterns. Judicial developments include not
only appellate court rulings, but also landmark rulings issued by the trial
courts presiding over the statewide asbestos multidistrict litigation pro-
ceeding and the federal silica multidistrict proceeding. Most of the note-
worthy activity during the Survey period took place in the legislatures.
The Texas Legislature joined other states in enacting sweeping legislation
that promises drastically to curtail asbestos and silica litigation in the
state courts. In addition, Congress considered, but has not yet passed,
federal legislation that would eliminate asbestos litigation entirely and
channel claims for compensation to a new bureaucracy run by the federal
government and funded by industry. Congress also passed legislation de-
signed to correct perceived abuses in class-action litigation.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. TEXAS LEGISLATION
In 2003, the Texas Legislature addressed perceived deficiencies in
Texas tort law by enacting legislation still known to practitioners and
commentators as "House Bill 4." Although House Bill 4's caps on non-
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economic damages in medical malpractice cases received the most atten-
tion in the popular press, the bill's scope is so comprehensive that it has
been described by Justice Hecht as "among the most sweeping statutes
the legislature has ever enacted."1 As a previous Survey notes, House
Bill 4 contains provisions that specifically and directly address the man-
agement of mass-tort litigation, such as the statute creating MDL proce-
dures for mass-tort cases and the statute amending rules governing class
actions.2 Additionally, many substantive provisions of general applica-
tion in the bill-such as the effective abolition of joint and several liabil-
ity, the erection of presumptions of non-liability for injuries caused by a
product upon proof of federal agency approval of the product, and the
creation of a procedure for partial shifting of attorney's fees following a
formal offer of settlement-will have a particular impact on toxic-tort
litigation.
In its 2005 session, the Texas Legislature was more focused in its revi-
sion of tort law. Its principal achievement in this area was its enactment
of Senate Bill 15, an overhaul of the common-law rules for resolving
claims for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos or silica. Under the
common law as applied in Texas (and in most states), a person could re-
cover damages for any injury or abnormality caused by asbestos or silica,
regardless of its severity. For decades, lawyers and legal scholars with ties
to the asbestos industry argued that because of the vast number of per-
sons claiming compensation for such injuries, the common-law standard
was too permissive. 3 Compensation should be limited, these commenta-
tors contended, to persons who could demonstrate significant impairment
from an asbestos-related disease. They proposed that courts adopt spe-
cific, "objective" medical criteria for establishing impairment and place
any claim in which the claimant could not satisfy the criteria on an "inac-
tive" or "suspense" docket. Alternatively, they urged Congress and state
legislatures to pass laws making the ability to satisfy specific medical cri-
teria a substantive prerequisite to recover damages in asbestos cases.4
1. Justice Nathan L. Hecht, House Bill 4 Symposium Issue, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 729,
729 (2005).
2. Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Carla M. Burke, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 57 SMU L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-
Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 383, 383 n.aal (1993) (acknowledging that "the re-
search reflected in this Article was funded in part by the Center for Claims Resolution
(CCR), an organization established to pursue alternatives to asbestos litigation"); Peter H.
Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 541 n.al (1992) (acknowledging that the author "wrote on this
subject at the request of the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), a non-profit claims
resolution facility representing twenty companies involved as defendants in the asbestos
litigation, and his work was funded by the CCR").
4. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Congress
Should Act To Resolve the National Asbestos Crisis: The Basis in Law and Public Policy for
Meaningful Progress, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 839, 870-72 (2003); George Scott Christian & Dale
Craymer, Texas Asbestos Litigation Reform: A Model for the States, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 981,
985-87 (2003).
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In May 2004, the Texas court presiding over the statewide asbestos
multidistrict litigation entered an order refusing to create an inactive
docket for so-called "unimpaired" cases.5 While petitions for review of
the order were pending in the Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Legisla-
ture finally succumbed to the pressure for reform and enacted medical
criteria for both asbestosis and silicosis claims.6 The substantive and pro-
cedural requirements for pursuing claims based on injuries caused by ex-
posure to asbestos and silica are contained in new Chapter 90 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Under the legislation, all plain-
tiffs seeking compensation for an injury caused by asbestos or silica must
file a report from a board-certified physician attesting to the presence of
the disease and its relationship to the substance in question.7 The reports
filed by plaintiffs seeking damages for nonmalignant asbestos-related and
silica-related diseases must additionally (1) state that the plaintiff was
physically examined by the physician who prepared the report or by a
medical professional under the physician's supervision and control; (2)
contain a detailed occupational, exposure, medical, and smoking history;
(3) verify that the plaintiff's x-rays show abnormalities of a specified level
of profusion (at least 1/1 under the grading system of the International
Labour Organization); and (4) verify that the plaintiff has pulmonary im-
pairment as demonstrated by specific abnormal findings on pulmonary-
function tests.8 The law further provides that in exceptional cases, plain-
tiffs that do not meet the impairment criteria may nevertheless qualify for
compensation if their x-rays show a greater degree of abnormality. Cases
filed after the effective date of the act (September 1, 2005) in which the
plaintiff does not file the required report are subject to mandatory
dismissal.9
The legislation also broadens the reach of the MDL statute by making
it applicable to asbestos and silica cases filed before September 1, 2003,
unless (1) the action was set for trial, and was actually tried, within 90
days of the act's effective date; (2) the plaintiff served a report complying
with the new requirements within 90 days of the act's effective date; or
(3) the case involves an alleged asbestos-related mesothelioma or an as-
bestos- or silica-related cancer. 10 Thus, except for cases involving cancer
or the handful of cases in which plaintiffs filed complying reports, all as-
bestos and silica personal-injury litigation is now subject to the manage-
ment of the respective MDL pretrial courts. The act further provides that
cases transferred to the MDL proceeding under the new law may not be
remanded for trial unless and until the plaintiff serves a report complying
5. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 145 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
6. Act of May 16, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 169.
7. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.003 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (asbestos);
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.004 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (silica).
8. Id. §§ 90.003-.004.
9. Id. § 90.007.
10. Id. § 90.010(a).
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with the new requirements.1 Additionally, the new law prohibits consol-
idation of asbestos or silica personal-injury cases for trial; the cases must
be tried individually "unless all parties agree otherwise. 12
Senate Bill 15 purports to confer three benefits on some persons ex-
posed to asbestos or silica. First, it all but abolishes the statute of limita-
tions for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos or silica. The bill adds a
new section to the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which provides that a
cause of action for injuries caused by asbestos or silica accrues on the
date that the claimant serves on a defendant the report required by the
new legislation or on the date of the exposed person's death, whichever is
earlier.' 3 Although the statute of limitations may bar wrongful-death
cases in which the cause of the fatal disease is initially unknown, it is
unlikely that the statute will ever bar another personal-injury case, as the
date of accrual is now entirely within the control of the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's attorney.
The legislation also amends the Government Code to require trial
courts to give scheduling preference to "actions in which the claimant has
been diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, other malignant asbestos-
related cancer or acute silicosis."'1 4 Although many courts have histori-
cally given preferential or special settings in malignancy cases as an exer-
cise of judicial discretion, the granting of preference in such cases is now
a statutory imperative.
Finally, the bill adds to the Insurance Code a provision that prohibits
insurance companies from "us[ing] the fact that a person has been ex-
posed to asbestos fibers or silica" to "reject, deny, limit, cancel, refuse to
renew, increase the premiums for, or otherwise adversely affect the per-
son's eligibility for or coverage under the policy or contract."'1 5 It is now
against the law in Texas for an insurance company to discriminate against
persons exposed to asbestos or silica in providing coverage or in setting
premiums.
Texas was not alone in enacting minimum medical criteria for claimants
seeking compensation for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos or sil-
ica. Legislatures in Florida, Georgia, and Ohio passed statutes adopting
similar criteria for application in asbestos and silica litigation.' 6 How-
ever, trial courts in Ohio and Georgia have issued. orders holding that
application of the new statutory requirements would violate various pro-
visions of the respective state's constitution. 17 It remains to be seen
11. Id. § 90.010(d).
12. Id. § 90.009.
13. Id. § 16.031.
14. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 23.101(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
15. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.53X(c) (Vernon 2005).
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.204 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 (Supp.
2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.92 (West 2005).
17. In re: Special Docket No. 73958, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, Entry and Opinion (Jan. 6, 2006) (per Hanna, Sepellacy, and Sweeney, J.J.)
(on file with the author); Judith H. Ross v. Georgia Pacific Corp., No. 2003AB00206, in the
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whether similar constitutional challenges will be asserted against the ap-
plication of Senate Bill 15 in Texas.
Absent a successful constitutional challenge, the effect that Senate Bill
15 will have on asbestos and silica personal-injury litigation cannot be
overstated. From now on, asbestos and silica cases may proceed to trial
only with the approval of the MDL pretrial court. Only cases involving
catastrophic injuries such as mesothelioma, lung cancer, and disabling as-
bestosis or silicosis may proceed to trial, and, absent an unlikely agree-
ment of the parties, they must be tried one at a time. Application of the
statute will thus dramatically reduce the volume, if not the quality, of
asbestos and silica cases filed and tried in Texas.
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The most significant developments in Congress during the Survey pe-
riod relating to mass torts and toxic torts involved proposed legislation
that did not pass. For many years, Congress has considered but failed to
enact proposals that would reform asbestos-litigation in the state and fed-
eral courts by imposing medical criteria on claimants similar to that ulti-
mately enacted in Texas and other states. In 2004, the major proponents
of asbestos litigation reform abandoned this approach in favor of a pro-
posal that would channel all asbestos claims to a federally administered
trust funded by defendants in the asbestos litigation, their insurers, and
bankruptcy trusts created to pay asbestos claims. Although the bill failed
in 2004, it was reintroduced on April 8, 2005 as Senate Bill 852, the "Fair-
ness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005."18 After extensive pri-
vate negotiations with the manufacturers and insurers who would fund
the trust, public committee hearings, and lengthy mark-up sessions, the
Senate Judiciary Committee voted 13-5 to approve the measure. 19 Some
senators, however, noted that they did not support the bill as currently
drafted; they only voted to approve the bill to send it to the full Senate
for further debate and amendment. Predictably, some Democrats as-
serted that the $140-billion fund that the bill would create would be too
small to compensate all victims of asbestos disease, while several Repub-
licans complained that the proposed fund was too generous. Although
approval of the bill by the committee created momentum, prospects for
passage suffered a serious blow when some manufacturers and insurers
withdrew their support. Like Rasputin, however, this ambitious proposal
for asbestos-litigation reform has not succumbed easily. Republican Sen-
ate leader William Frist has announced his intention to call the bill to the
floor in the first part of 2006.20
Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia (Nov. 25, 2005) (per Downs, J.) (on file with the
author).
18. S. 852, 109th Cong. (2006).
19. Stephen Labaton, Bill To Create Asbestos Disease Fund Goes to Senate for Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2005, at C7.
20. Frist Says Asbestos Bill Will Be First Order of Business Next Year, CONGRESS
DAILY, Nov. 16, 2005, available at 2005 WL 18588567.
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Despite pressure from the oil industry and other energy interests, Con-
gress refused to include a provision preempting liability for environmen-
tal harm caused by the fuel additive methyl tertiary butyl ether
("MTBE") in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Since 1990, MTBE has
been widely used by gasoline manufacturers to cleanse automobile emis-
sions, but the additive has leaked from underground storage tanks, con-
taminating drinking-water supplies throughout the country. The version
of the energy bill approved by the House contained a "safe harbor" pro-
vision that would have relieved gasoline and MTBE suppliers of responsi-
bility under state product-liability law for clean-up costs. The liability
waiver would have been retroactive to September 5, 2003, and would
have barred several pending lawsuits brought by municipalities and other
providers of drinking water.21 But the provision was opposed by water
suppliers and environmental groups and was omitted from the legislation
signed into law by President Bush on August 8, 2005.22
One piece of legislation that Congress did manage to enact is the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (the "Act"), signed into law by President
Bush on February 18, 2005.23 The Act is intended to remedy perceived
abuses of the class-action device by state courts, including the increasing
willingness of remote state courts to certify nationwide class actions that
have little connection with the jurisdiction and the proliferation of "cou-
pon settlements" that provide little benefit to class members but can gen-
erate large fees for class counsel. The Act broadens federal court
jurisdiction over class actions by amending the diversity statute to author-
ize federal jurisdiction over any proposed class action in which the aggre-
gate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and in which any plaintiff
is diverse from any defendant.2 4 The Act also requires courts presiding
over class actions in which coupon settlements are proposed to calculate
class counsel's attorney's fee based on either the value of the coupons
actually redeemed by class members (as opposed to the value of the cou-
pons issued by the defendant) or by the hours reasonably spent by coun-
sel on the case.25 Although the substantive provisions of the Act are
directed primarily at commercial class actions rather than mass-tort class
actions, the Act includes a provision authorizing the exercise of federal
diversity jurisdiction over certain "mass actions" in which "monetary re-
lief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or
21. Debra DeHaney-Howard, Major Victory for Mayors on MTBE Liability Protec-
tion, U.S. MAYOR NEWSPAPER, Aug. 8, 2005, available at http://www.usmayors.org/USCM
us-mayornewspaper/documents/08 08 05/MTBE.asp.
22. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
23. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
24. Pub. L. No. 107-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 78 U.S.C. 1332(d)). The Act,
however, requires abstention if two-thirds or more of the proposed class members are citi-
zens of the state in which the action was filed and permits abstention if at least one-third of
the class are citizens of the forum state. Id.
25. Id. § 3 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1712).
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fact."' 26 It appears that this provision intended to eliminate mass consoli-
dations such as the unified asbestos trial of some 8,000 plaintiffs in West
Virginia in 2002.27 Although widely reported, such "mega-trials" are
rare, so it is unlikely that this provision will have a major impact on mass
tort litigation in Texas or elsewhere.
II. TEXAS MDL TRANSFERS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. THE SILICA LITIGATION TRANSFER ORDER
As reported in the last Survey, House Bill 4 created a Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL"), which consolidated cases involving al-
legations of injury caused by exposure to silica before Judge Tracy Chris-
topher of the 295th District Court of Harris County as the pretrial
judge.28 Judge Christopher has entered a series of case-management or-
ders designed to prepare the cases for trial promptly and to promote the
remand of cases in an orderly, manageable way.29 Judge Christopher has
not yet entered any order relating to any common substantive legal issue
in the silica litigation.
B. ORDERS OF THE STATE ASBESTOS MDL PRETRIAL COURT
The district judge overseeing the Texas multidistrict litigation for asbes-
tos cases, Judge Mark Davidson of the Harris County Eleventh District
Court in Houston, issued several significant rulings in 2004 and 2005. The
first ruling, issued on January 20, 2004, involved a global motion filed by
DaimlerChrysler Corporation and other automobile manufacturers. The
manufacturers asked the court to strike all expert testimony that asbes-
tos-containing "friction products," such as brakes and clutches, can cause
any asbestos-related disease. The court granted the motion in part, find-
ing that epidemiological studies involving friction products were not suffi-
cient to "establish a causation link."' 30 The court denied the motion with
respect to case-specific evidence based on an individual plaintiff's physi-
cal condition and occupational history. Citing the testimony of a cell biol-
ogist who specialized in studying asbestos-related diseases, the court
found that such case-specific testimony was "scientifically provable, mea-
surable, peer-reviewed and credible. ' 31 The court concluded that it
would be necessary to conduct "a case-by-case review of the occupational
26. Id. § 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2000)).
27. State ex rel. Mobil Oil Co. v. Gaughan, 563 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 2002). See also In
re Hopeman Bros., 569 S.E.2d 409 (Va. 2002) (allowing consolidated trial of approximately
1,300 claims).
28. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 166 S.W.3d 3, 8 (Tex. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 2004); see Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Amanda R. Tyler, Toxic Torts
and Mass Torts, 58 SMU L. REv. 1183, 1184 (2005).
29. 295th Court-Orders, http://www.justex.net/civil/295/orders.htm.
30. In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 2004-03964 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Jan.





history of each Plaintiff, together with a review of the pathology, to deter-
mine whether there is a scientific basis to admit any evidence of
causation .... "32
The MDL court subsequently issued a more comprehensive ruling on
products containing chrysotile asbestos. Georgia-Pacific and Garlock,
manufacturers of chrysotile asbestos products, made a global motion to
exclude expert testimony that chrysotile asbestos causes mesothelioma, a
rare form of cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. The manufacturers
argued that the scientific evidence did not establish that chrysotile asbes-
tos, as distinguished from other types of asbestos, caused mesothelioma.
After a lengthy hearing, the MDL court denied the motion on June 30,
2005. Citing several epidemiological studies that reported a statistically
significant link between chrysotile asbestos and mesothelioma, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had "made a valid epidemiological case." 33
The court also reviewed expert testimony from two cell biologists who
studied asbestos-related diseases and found that the testimony was "cred-
ible, consistent, generally accepted in the scientific literature, and is suffi-
cient evidence, even without epidemiological evidence discussed above,
for proof of general causation. '34
The MDL pretrial court also issued a letter ruling in which it consid-
ered motions for summary judgment filed by two suppliers of raw asbes-
tos who contended that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs because the
asbestos was merely a "component" in products that other companies
manufactured and sold. The suppliers argued that the court should apply
the test in section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity, under which liability is imposed on the supplier of a component of a
product only if (1) the component is defective in itself, or (2) the supplier
substantially participates in the integration of the component into the de-
sign of the product and the inclusion of the component causes the prod-
uct to be defective. The MDL pretrial court agreed that the Texas
Supreme Court would apply the Restatement's test, but found that the
suppliers had not established, as a matter of law, that the test would not
be satisfied. The court cited evidence that one of the suppliers "substan-
tially participated" in the design of the finished products by discounting
health risks associated with asbestos and noted that the other supplier
had failed to establish that asbestos was not "inherently dangerous." The
court thus denied both defendants' motions.35
32. Id.
33. In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 2004-03964 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. June
30, 2005), available at http://www.justex.net/civil/11/orders.htm (follow "Georgia Pacific
Robinson Havner" link).
34. Id.
35. In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 2004-03964 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Sept.
26, 2005), available at http://www.justex.netcivil/11/orders.htm (follow "THAN and UC
Bulk Supplier MFSJ" link).
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C. ORDERS OF THE FEDERAL SILICA MDL COURT
No discussion of developments in mass-tort and toxic-tort litigation
during the Survey period would be complete without mention of the volu-
minous and scathing critique of case-screening practices in the federal sil-
ica MDL proceeding by United States District Judge Janis Jack. 36 In
September 2003, the federal MDL panel transferred over 10,000 silica
claims to Judge Jack's court in Corpus Christi, most of which had been
originally filed in Mississippi state court and removed to federal court.
The plaintiffs, represented by various counsel, disputed federal court ju-
risdiction and moved for remand of the cases to Mississippi state court.
In the course of supervising discovery on the jurisdictional issues, Judge
Jack became concerned that many of the claims lacked a sufficient factual
basis to support the exercise of jurisdiction. She ordered plaintiffs' desig-
nated medical experts to appear in court for a Daubert hearing to deter-
mine the admissibility of the diagnosis of injury caused by silica. After
three days of testimony, Judge Jack concluded that "virtually all of the
diagnoses fail to satisfy the minimum, medically-acceptable criteria for
the diagnosis of silicosis, and therefore, the testimony of the challenged
doctors cannot be admissible under the standards set by Rule 702 and
Daubert. ' '37 Judge Jack recited her grounds for this conclusion at exhaus-
tive, and painful, length: the number of silicosis filings in Mississippi ex-
ceeded by a factor of five the total number of silicosis cases expected in
the entire United States during the same time period; of the 9,000 claim-
ants that filed diagnosis information, more than 8,000 treating doctors
were identified but only 12 were listed as witnesses who could attest to
the silicosis diagnosis; the doctors often did not sign, prepare, or even
review their reports; the diagnosing verbiage in thousands of the reports
was identical; several of the doctors withdrew their diagnoses when ad-
vised by defense counsel of the underlying data; thousands of the claim-
ants had also previously claimed compensation for asbestosis, although
the presence of asbestosis and silicosis in the same person, though theo-
retically possible, is extremely rare; and several of the doctors interpreted
the very same x-ray as showing only silicosis when the x-ray was offered
to support a claim for silicosis and as showing only asbestosis when the x-
ray was offered to support an asbestosis claim. Judge Jack expressed her
view that "these diagnoses were about litigation rather than health care"
and "were manufactured for money. ' 38 However, because Judge Jack
also concluded that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
vast majority of the claims, Judge Jack's observations were, for the most
part, advisory only.39 Judge Jack found that the court had jurisdiction
over one case involving 100 plaintiffs, and ruled that the diagnoses of
36. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
37. Id. at 625.
38. Id. at 635.
39. Id. at 665.
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silicosis were inadmissible in that case.40 The judge added that by contin-
uing to prosecute the claims after learning that the diagnoses were "fa-
tally unreliable, 4 1  plaintiffs' counsel had "multiplie[d] the
proceedings.., unreasonably and vexatiously" and would be required to
pay defendants' costs, expenses, and attorney's fees arising from the
Daubert hearing and related proceedings. 42
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In toxic and mass tort cases, the first obstacle faced by many plaintiffs
is obtaining personal jurisdiction over manufacturers in a global market.
In Glas v. Adame,43 a class action brought by United States veterans suf-
fering from Gulf War Syndrome, the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston reversed the trial court's denial of a special appearance
by a German manufacturer of glass vessels used in Iraq's chemical-war-
fare program. First, the court concluded that the jurisdictional analysis
would include only contacts until the date of injury: in this case, the sum-
mer of 1991, when the Gulf War ended. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the discovery rule should apply to define the date of in-
jury. In addition, the court denied the plaintiffs three bases for finding
sufficient contacts with Texas. First, the plaintiffs' attempted to impute
contacts of related corporate entities, which was rejected without analysis
for failure to plead that the entities were a "single business enterprise. 44
Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to impute the contacts of a
Texas sales representative to the defendant because the evidence was fac-
tually insufficient to establish that the sales representative was the defen-
dant's agent, that is, that it "controlled the means and details of [his]
work."' 45 Finally, the court found that the defendant's own contacts with
the forum-product sales transacted almost entirely F.O.B. Germany and
several trips to the forum, virtually all either service calls initiated by a
customer request or trade exhibitions in which the defendant had no
voice in choosing a location-were insufficient to establish general juris-
diction over the defendant.
Even plaintiffs exposed to dangerous products in Texas face difficulties
in obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In Thunderbird
Supply Co. v. Williams,4 6 the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of a special appearance filed by a New Mexico manu-
facturer of a silica-containing polishing compound, finding that its sales to
40. Id. at 666.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id. at 676 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000)).
43. 178 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
44. Id. at 314.
45. Id. at 316.
46. 161 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet. h.)
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a New York retailer who marketed its product to a Texas jeweler were
insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. Comparing the case to
CMMC v. Salinas, the court found that the evidence did not demonstrate
that the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the Texas market" be-
cause it did not market its product in Texas or attempt to serve a Texas
market.47 The evidence did not reflect that the defendant "was even
aware that a third party marketed Thunderbird's products in Texas." '48
The appellate court declined to consider the plaintiff's argument that the
exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant was warranted because
the plaintiff had not alleged in the petition that the defendant had "con-
tinuous and systematic contacts" with Texas and because the trial court's
findings of fact related solely to specific jurisdiction. 49 The court also de-
clined to remand the case for further discovery because the plaintiff did
not request a continuance for further discovery from the trial court.50
2. Statute of Limitations
Because toxic injuries are often latent and their causes can remain un-
discovered for some time, defining the date of accrual and applying the
discovery rule is often a contested issue. In Pirtle v. Kahn,51 the First
District Court of Appeals in Houston ruled that the statute of limitations
began to run on the plaintiff's personal-injury claims for mold-related ill-
ness at the time she discovered the mold growing in her apartment rather
than at the time that a doctor expressly linked her illness to mold expo-
sure. The plaintiff claimed that she suffered symptoms from the time that
she moved into her apartment and was diagnosed with various diseases,
but did not discover the mold until about four years later. The plaintiff
argued that her action did not accrue until she received the results of
environmental mold tests and was diagnosed by her doctor with mold-
related disease. The court held that when she discovered the mold in her
apartment and believed that it had caused her illness, she was "on notice
... of facts that would cause a reasonable person to make inquiries suffi-
cient to discover her causes of action."'52 Because the plaintiff did not file
her claims for almost three years after she discovered the mold, the court
affirmed summary judgment on her claims for negligence, premises liabil-
ity, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act; however, the
court reversed summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for common-
law fraud or fraudulent inducement, which were governed by a four-year
statute of limitations.
47. Id. at 735 (citing CMMC v. Salinas, 929 S.W.2d 435, 436-40 (Tex. 1996)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 736.
51. 177 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Tex. App. -Houston [lst Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
52. Id. at 574.
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3. Federal Removal Jurisdiction
Forum choice remained an issue in toxic-tort cases this year, as defend-
ants continued to accuse plaintiffs of improperly joining resident defend-
ants to avoid federal jurisdiction. In McDonal v. Abbott Laboratories,53
the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's refusal to remand the plaintiffs' claims against various manufac-
turers and physicians for causing their daughter's mercury poisoning. The
court held that resident physicians were improperly joined because suit
against them was jurisdictionally barred by the National Childhood Vac-
cine Act ("Vaccine Act") until the plaintiff exhausted her remedies
before the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Vaccine Court").
The court noted that if the Vaccine Act applied equally to bar claims
against all the defendants, as the district court had found, the common
defense theory would require remand of the case because "the resident
defendants were no more improperly joined than the non-resident de-
fendants. '54 Citing its decision in Moss v. Merck & Co., however, the
court held that the Vaccine Act did not apply to plaintiffs' claims against
the thimerosol manufacturers, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of those claims. 55 Because the Vaccine Act's jurisdic-
tional defense applied to some, but not all, of the defendants, denial of
the motion to remand was proper.
In Ramirez v. American Home Products,56 a federal district court fol-
lowed McDonal in a factually similar case in which the child suffered au-
tism. The court denied the motion to remand, dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims against the resident physicians and the vaccine manufacturers
without prejudice so that the plaintiffs could pursue their claims before
the Vaccine Court, and stayed the plaintiffs' claims against the thimerosal
manufacturer pending the plaintiffs' exhaustion of remedies under the
Vaccine Act.57
4. Case Management and Discovery
Case management and other discovery-control issues continue to arise
in mass tort litigation. This Survey period included a case in which an
appellate court affirmed a trial court's use of a Lone Pine order. The
term "Lone Pine order" originates from an unreported New Jersey trial
court decision from 1986, styled Lore v. Lone Pine Corp.,58 in which the
court ordered the multiple plaintiffs to present prima facie causation evi-
dence for their claims against hundreds of defendants before the end of
the discovery period. In recent years, some Texas courts have approved
53. 408 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2005).
54. Id. at 183-84.
55. Id. at 185 (citing Moss v. Merck & Co., 381 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2004)).
56. No. C.A. B-03-155, 2005 WL 2277518 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2005).
57. Id. at *5-7.
58. No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).
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of the use of Lone Pine orders in certain mass tort cases. 59 In Bell v.
ExxonMobil Corp.,60 the First District Court of Appeals in Houston con-
sidered a Lone Pine order entered by a trial court, which required fifty
plaintiffs to submit expert reports and affidavits substantiating their per-
sonal-injury and property damage claims arising from an explosion and
chemical release at the ExxonMobil plant in Baytown, Texas. These fifty
plaintiffs had been parties to an earlier, identical suit filed by seventy-one
plaintiffs and had non-suited their claims after the judge in the first case
entered a Lone Pine order. The plaintiffs then refiled their claims in an-
other court. Unfortunately, their cases were transferred back to the origi-
nal court, which then reentered the Lone Pine order. The plaintiffs did
not initially object to the second order, but renewed their objections once
the judge threatened dismissal of their claims for noncompliance with the
order. When twenty-three of the plaintiffs failed to comply, even after
the judge granted additional time to submit the reports and affidavits, the
trial court dismissed the claims of those plaintiffs. 61 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed the dismissal of their claims, arguing that the trial court lacked the
authority to issue the Lone Pine order and, in the alternative, that the
trial court erred in using the "death penalty" sanction of dismissal for
failure to comply with the order.62 After finding that the appellants
waived their first issue by failing to cite authority for their contention that
the court lacked the authority to issue the order, the appellate court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the death-
penalty sanction, noting the "appellants' many opportunities to comply
with the court's order and their refusal to do so."'63
Given the paramount importance of causation in toxic-tort cases, par-
ties often request leave to perform testing of allegedly contaminated ar-
eas. Since these requests can lead to delays in the resolution of cases,
courts must balance the need for testing against the need for progress in
the litigation. In In re Dominion Resources, Inc.,64 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals conducted this kind of balancing exercise in considering
defendants' requests for testing. The underlying tort case involved allega-
tions of underground hydrocarbon contamination, which the plaintiffs al-
leged were caused by leaking gasoline- and fuel-storage facilities and a
natural-gas pipeline. The plaintiffs' experts concluded that "some of the
pipeline's valves leaked creating cone-shaped areas of contamination in
59. See Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. 2004); Marti-
nez v. City of San Antonio, 40 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); In
re Mohawk Rubber Co., 982 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding);
Adjemian v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., No. 08-00-00336-CV, 2002 WL 358829 (Tex. App.-
El Paso Mar. 7, 2002, no pet.); In re Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., No. 08-01-00351-CV, 2001
WL 1555656 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso Dec. 6, 2001, no pet.).
60. No. 01-04-00171-CV, 2005 WL 497295 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3,
2005, pet. denied).
61. Id. at *1-2.
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id. at *4.
64. Nos. 13-04-00536-CV, 13-04-00622-CV, 2005 WL 310778 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Feb. 10, 2005, no pet. h.).
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the soil."' 65 The relators, current and former owners of the pipeline, re-
quested leave to "pressure-test the valves and test the soil adjacent to the
pipeline to determine if the plaintiffs' theory of contamination is cor-
rect."'66 The relators also requested leave to "measure and test aban-
doned sections of pipe unearthed during excavations near the pipeline" in
order to determine "whether the pieces were ever part of the Dominion
pipeline. ' 67 The trial court denied both of these requests.
On mandamus, the court of appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying relators' first request, but not in denying their sec-
ond request. The court directed the trial court "to allow relators to per-
form such testing of the ground, valves, and pipe as is reasonably
responsive to the ... testimony of the plaintiffs' experts," but it provided
that the "testing must be performed expeditiously and may not delay a
further trial setting in this matter."68 In denying relators' supplemental
petition for writ of mandamus as to the second testing request, the court
noted that the "destructive testing protocol would entail cutting, marking,
cleaning, measuring, and testing the pipe for chemical and metallurgical
content."' 69 The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the destructive testing not warranted "[g]iven the apparent physi-
cal discrepancy of the abandoned parts of the pipeline, and given that
relators have denied ownership of these parts."'70
Expert testimony is often the linchpin in toxic-tort cases. One periph-
eral but crucial issue in many of these cases is any alleged biases of these
experts. In In re Weir,71 the defendants filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus after the trial court ordered a second deposition of defendants' ex-
pert witness, Frances W. Weir, for testimony regarding the percentage of
his income received from litigation-related work and his total income for
that work over a three-year period. The Beaumont Court of Appeals
conditionally granted the petition, holding that the trial court's order con-
stituted an abuse of discretion. The court relied on precedent from the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, 72 explaining that "[t]he parties' interests in
obtaining discovery solely for impeachment must be weighed against the
witness's legitimate interest in protecting unrelated financial informa-
tion."'73 The court noted that the expert witness had provided some testi-
mony regarding bias in the first deposition, including "his hourly rate, his
time spent working on the case, and the fact he testifies almost exclu-
sively for defendants. '74 The court held that "[t]he deposition ordered





70. Id. at *3.
71. 166 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding).
72. Id. at 864-65 (citing Olinger v. Curry, 926 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1996, no writ.)).
73. Id. at 865.
74. Id.
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here would not materially benefit the dispute resolution process in this
case" and that "[t]he intrusion on the witness's privacy interest, the bur-
den in obtaining the information, and the impact on the willingness of
reputable experts to provide testimony when needed in litigation out-
weigh any possible benefit from the additional discovery ordered. '75
In In re Southwest Airlines Co.,7 6 plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in 2002 for
personal injuries that they allegedly sustained from exposure to toxic
chemicals while working at a Southwest Airlines reservation center dur-
ing their employment in the 1980s and early 1990s. The plaintiffs rebut-
ted defendant's limitations defense in discovery responses, stating that
Southwest had "covered up the extent of the unreasonably dangerous in-
door air quality" and that plaintiffs were "unaware of the concealment
until discovery of matter by [their] attorney which was communicated to
[them] in November of 2001."77 When defense counsel asked the plain-
tiffs at their depositions what was communicated to them in November
2001, plaintiffs claimed that the information communicated was protected
by the attorney-client privilege. Defendant filed a motion to compel, ar-
guing that the plaintiffs' offensive use of the privilege resulted in its
waiver. After the trial court denied the motion, defendant petitioned for
writ of mandamus. The San Antonio Court of Appeals conditionally
granted the petition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's motion to compel. The court found that "South-
west's ability to succeed on its limitations defense hinges on what was
discovered in the November 2001 communication" and that "disclosure
of the communication is the only means by which Southwest can obtain
evidence regarding the plaintiffs' affirmative defense to Southwest's limi-
tations defense because the communication contains the information on
which the plaintiffs seek to rely to defeat limitations. '78 The court held
that sufficient factors existed to find that a waiver under the offensive-use
doctrine had occurred and instructed the trial court to grant Southwest's
motion to compel. 79
5. Admissibility and Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence of Causation
The admissibility and sufficiency of expert testimony concerning causa-
tion remained a critical and outcome-determinative issue in toxic tort
cases during the Survey period. In Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores,80 the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, find-
ing sufficient evidence that exposure to asbestos fibers released from the
defendant's brake pads caused the plaintiff's asbestosis. The court relied
on testimony that the plaintiff ground new brake pads before installation,
the grinding produced visible dust that he inhaled, the brake pads con-
75. Id.
76. 155 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding).
77. Id. at 623.
78. Id. at 624.
79. Id. (citing Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993)).
80. 153 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. granted).
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tained seven to twenty-eight percent asbestos by weight, and the dust
contained respirable asbestos fibers that "can cause asbestosis. ' '8 1 The
court distinguished the decision of the San Antonio Court of Appeals in
In re ROC Pretrial, reported in the last Survey,82 which found no evi-
dence that respirable asbestos fibers were released from spraying, sand-
ing, or grinding liquid paint or coating products based on the expert
testimony presented by the plaintiff.
In Burleson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice,83 the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the plain-
tiff's expert's testimony and the grant of summary judgment against an
inmate exposed to welding electrodes containing thorium dioxide, a natu-
rally occurring, radioactive carcinogen. In this civil-rights action, the trial
court excluded the toxicologist's opinion that inhaled thorium dioxin par-
ticles from the welding electrodes lodged in the plaintiff's airways dam-
aged local cells-the "radiation hot spot" theory-and that this exposure
was more significant to his development of throat and lung cancer than
his forty-five year, two-pack-per-day smoking history or his family history
of cancer. 84 Although the toxicologist cited studies in which exposure to
Thorotrast (which also contains thorium dioxide) was found to cause cer-
tain cancers, the court noted that the studies did not link that exposure to
throat or lung cancer. The court also noted that the toxicologist failed to
assess the plaintiff's dose of radiation. Based on this evidence, the court
held that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testi-
mony of the toxicologist, and in the absence of admissible evidence that
exposure to the welding electrodes caused his cancer, summary judgment
was proper.85
In Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp. ,86 more than fifty plaintiffs alleged
that exposure to natural uranium released from the defendant's facility
and vehicles caused them to develop a variety of cancers. A federal dis-
trict court excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs' medical expert on spe-
cific causation, finding that the expert failed to consider the relative
significance of other possible causes of the plaintiffs' cancers. The ex-
pert's "methodology. . . involve[d] taking a diagnosed condition-can-
cer-finding all possible causes of that person's cancer from the universe
of potential causes, and declaring all possible causes to be actual causes
and but-for causes. '"87 Although the federal district court had jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act,88 the court
noted that Texas substantive law would govern its rulings on the plain-
81. Id. at 213-14.
82. See Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Amanda R. Tyler, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 58 SMU L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2005) (discussing In re ROC Pretrial, 131 S.W.3d 129
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.)).
83. 393 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2004).
84. Id. at 682-83.
85. Id. at 587-90.
86. 362 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
87. Id. at 846.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. 2003).
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tiffs' claims. The court determined that the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner "controls the issue of
what evidence is required to establish causation in a toxic tort case and
therefore what evidence is relevant."'8 9 Disagreeing with language from a
vacated opinion by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that
suggested that the Havner definition of the "more likely than not burden
of proof" was arguably procedural, the court held that Havner's standards
for legally sufficient evidence in a toxic-tort case are a matter of Texas
substantive law.90 The court then rejected the expert's treatment of all
risk factors and all levels of exposure as substantial contributing causes of
the plaintiffs' cancers because, while "the severity of cancer, once it ex-
ists, is independent of dose, the risk of cancer development is dose depen-
dent." 91  The court also criticized the expert's selective use of
epidemiological studies to show an association between exposure to ion-
izing radiation and the plaintiffs' cancers without regard for the type,
source, and dose of radiation. When the expert tried to identify cases in
which exposure to radiation was a predominant cause of a plaintiff's can-
cer, he compared the yearly dose of background radiation with the cumu-
lative organ dose from exposure to the defendant's uranium, leading the
court to conclude that the expert's methodology-"comparing apples to
oranges"-was flawed and unreliable. 92
In Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc.,93 a federal district judge held that the
plaintiffs' concession that they could not prove that thimerosal exposure
had caused a child's autism precluded the plaintiffs' expert from testifying
that thimerosal exposure caused the child's co-morbid conditions (which
included sensory- and auditory-processing disorders, attention deficits,
hyperactivity and distractibility, cognitive deficits, and behavior and
mood disorders). Because the child did not fit the genetic profile of chil-
dren who are particularly vulnerable to developing thimerosal-induced
autism, the plaintiffs conceded they could not prove thimerosal exposure
caused the child's autism. And while the plaintiffs' expert cited studies
that showed a correlation between thimerosal exposure and co-morbid
conditions suffered by the child, those studies involved autistic children.
The co-morbid conditions were strongly correlated with autism, with or
without exposure to thimerosal, and might have a common cause. The
court noted that because
these symptoms and conditions are so regularly associated with au-
tism, a medical doctor rendering a differential diagnosis would need
to be able to rule out all of the potential causes of the patient's con-
dition, including autism, before determining that the co-morbid con-
ditions were caused by something other than what had caused the
89. Cano, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 821-22 (discussing Merrell Dow Pharms.v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997)).
90. Id. at 821 n.13 (citing Bartley v. Euclid, 158 F.3d 261, 273 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998)).
91. Id. at 847 n.4 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 858.




The court therefore excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert on
specific causation, but it expressly left open the door for other "past or
future scientific attempts to parse the causes of autism from the causes of
the co-morbidities at the heart of the plaintiff's case." 95
In Martin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,96 a federal district court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claims for fear and increased risk of cancer caused
by exposure to arsenic from Chromated Copper Arsenate ("CCA")
Treated Wood because Texas law does not provide a "cause of action for
negligence or products liability until there is 'actual loss or damage result-
ing to the interests of another.' 97 The court then noted that the plain-
tiffs failed to show that they were actually at an increased risk of cancer,
the plaintiffs offered no studies linking exposure to CCA-Treated Wood
with increased risk of cancer, and the plaintiffs' expert admitted that "no
'good studies' exist regarding such a causal link."98 The plaintiffs' expert
did not quantify the plaintiffs' exposure and admitted that numerous
other exposures contribute to cancer risk aside from CCA-Treated Wood.
Being extremely thorough, the court then noted that the evidence did not
support a finding that the defendant made an express representation or a
misrepresentation of material fact, defeating the plaintiffs' claims for
breach of an express warranty, strict liability pursuant to section 402B of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and violation of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.
In Madden v. Wyeth, 99 a federal district court denied summary judg-
ment on causation, design defect, and punitive damages of the plaintiff's
claims for Stevens-Johnson Syndrome ("SJS") allegedly caused by
ibuprofen in Children's Advil. The court denied summary judgment on
causation because of conflicted expert testimony; while the defense ex-
pert testified that too little time elapsed between the child's ingestion of
the drug and development of SJS symptoms, the plaintiff presented testi-
mony from other experts that ibuprofen was the likely cause of the child's
SJS. Noting "substantial issues surrounding the admissibility of expert
testimony presented by both parties," the court was unwilling to rule on
objections to the admissibility of expert testimony "without the benefit of
fully-briefed Daubert motions." 100 The court declined to consider the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on general causation because,
without being able to resolve specific causation as a matter of law, a rul-
ing on general causation would not materially advance the resolution of
the case. The court denied summary judgment on the plaintiff's design-
94. Id. at 577.
95. Id. at 578-79.
96. 369 F. Supp. 2d 887 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
97. Id. at 890 (citing Gideon v. John-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136
(5th Cir. 1985)).
98. Id. at 891.
99. No. 3-03-CV-0167-BD, 2005 WL 2278081 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2005).
100. Id. at *1 n.1.
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defect claim based on evidence that dexibuprofen was a safer alternative,
even though dexibuprofen is not FDA-approved. Finally, the court de-
nied summary judgment on the punitive-damages claims, in part, because
studies demonstrated a statistically significant association between
ibuprofen and SJS, even though the incidence of SJS is very small. 10 1
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Premises Liability
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judg-
ment for a premises owner under Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code on en banc rehearing in Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena
Paper Co.,10 2 withdrawing its earlier opinions in the case. Dyall, an em-
ployee of an independent contractor, arrived at the Simpson plant to re-
pair a pinhole leak in a pipe. Dyall testified that Simpson employees
administered no safety warnings, gave him no safety-data sheets, and
gave no impression that the substance leaking from the pipe could be
dangerous, but Dyall could not recall whether Simpson employees told
him that the pipe might contain traces of chlorine dioxide. The evidence
showed that Simpson employees provided Dyall and his coworker with
emergency-escape respirators or "throw-down packs," but indicated that
they would not need more extensive safety equipment. After working on
the leaking pipe flange for about an hour and a half, Dyall became nause-
ated and vomited, and he later developed severe respiratory problems. 103
Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires a
plaintiff to show that the defendant property owner had both control over
the manner in which the work was performed and actual knowledge of
the dangerous condition that caused his injuries.10 4 The court rejected all
sixteen allegations Dyall made regarding ways in which Simpson con-
trolled Dyall's work. In response to Dyall's argument that Simpson exer-
cised control when Simpson's employee required him to carry an
emergency-escape respirator, the court held that the mere existence of
safety regulations does not establish Simpson's actual control over Dyall
and that liability only attaches to the premises owner where the imposi-
tion of safety regulations causes or leads to injury by increasing the
probability of injury.10 5
The court also rejected Dyall's argument that the legislature never in-
tended Chapter 95 to apply to a situation like his. Dyall relied on a state-
ment of legislative intent that Chapter 95 should not apply to claims
involving a premises owner's negligence, which is independent of the
owner's exercise of control over the contractor's work. The court held
that it did not need to consider legislative intent since the statute is clear
101. Id. at *3.
102. 152 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 693-96.
104. Id. at 699.
105. Id. at 701-04.
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and unambiguous, and even if legislative intent came into play in the
case, this case was not a case of independent negligence on the part of the
premises owner. The court also held that Dyall had presented no evi-
dence of Simpson's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Fi-
nally, the court rejected Dyall's common-law negligence claim, finding
that Chapter 95 and its requirements applied to all his claims, including
his negligence claims.10 6
The lengthy dissent took issue with the majority's treatment of the leg-
islative history of Chapter 95, arguing that the legislature meant "control"
to include actions of premises owners such as advising independent con-
tractors whether to use safety devices. The dissent went on to distinguish
other premises-liability cases cited by the majority opinion as cases in
which either the premises owner did not discuss how the job should be
completed or in which the independent contractor was working in an area
within his expertise. 10 7
2. Insurance Coverage for Mass Tort Cases
Insurance disputes between defendants in mass tort cases and their in-
surers continue to arise in the form of declaratory actions in federal court.
In Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Wright Materials Inc.,10 8 Wright Materi-
als, Inc. and MagicValley Concrete, Ltd. were defendants in a Texas state
court action involving personal injury claims of 134 construction workers
for injuries resulting from alleged exposure to silica dust. The defendants
and their insurer, Mt. Hawley Insurance Company, filed cross motions for
summary judgment regarding the defendants' insurance coverage. The
insurer contended that since the state court plaintiffs' claims arose out of
the release or escape of pollutants in general and silica dust in particular,
the claims fell within the policy exclusions, negating the insurer's duty to
defend. The magistrate judge for the Northern District of Texas had "lit-
tle difficulty in concluding that such injuries are excluded from coverage
under each of the Mt. Hawley policies." 10 9 The defendants relied on "a
narrow exception to the otherwise absolute pollution exclusion," and ar-
gued that there was a "latent ambiguity" in the plaintiffs' petition.1 10 De-
fendants focused on allegations in the petition that plaintiffs had "come
into contact with cement, ready-mix concrete, concrete and the dust gen-
erated therefrom" and argued that these allegations did not fall within
the policy exclusions since it was not clear whether these injuries were
caused by the release of pollutants or by contact with wet cement and
concrete.' The court rejected these arguments, finding that "a fair read-
ing of their petition makes clear that the plaintiffs base their claims on
'cement dust-related disease,"' granted Mt. Hawley's motion for sum-
106. Id. at 708-10.
107. Id. at 715-23.
108. No. 3-03-CV-2729-BD, 2005 WL 2805565 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2005).
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Id. at *3.
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mary judgment, and entered a declaratory judgment that Mt. Hawley had
no duty to defend or indemnify the defendants in the state court
action.12
In RLI Insurance Co. v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.,113 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether the district court abused its discre-
tion in staying a declaratory-judgment action pending the outcome of a
related California state court action. The insurer, RLI Insurance Com-
pany, filed the declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that
RLI did not owe its insured Wainoco Oil & Gas Company (now known as
Frontier Oil Corporation) a duty to defend or indemnify in California tort
actions. In 2003, Wainoco and Frontier were sued in California state
court for injuries that were allegedly caused by the release of toxic chemi-
cals at Beverly Hills High School from oil and gas facilities operated by
the defendants. Less than two weeks after RLI filed its declaratory-judg-
ment action in federal court in Texas, Wainoco and Frontier filed a de-
claratory-judgment action in California state court against RLI and the
rest of their primary insurers, seeking a declaration that the insurers
owed them a duty to defend and indemnify. They then moved to dismiss
or, in the alternative, to stay RLI's declaratory-judgment action. The dis-
trict court granted Wainoco and Frontier's motion and stayed the action
under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") 14 and the abstention doc-
trine found in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America.' 15 The appel-
late court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
exercising its abstention power since the court weighed the seven nonex-
clusive factors for abstention given in St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Trejo.1 1 6
The court found that "[b]ecause all the Trejo factors either weighed in
favor of yielding to the California coverage action, or were neutral, the
district court concluded it was appropriate to exercise its discretion under
the DJA and Brillhart and refrain from deciding this case."'1 17 The court
did note that the district court stayed, rather than dismissed, the case in
"an effort to assure the availability of a federal forum should the Califor-
nia action fail to resolve the matter in controversy."' 118
3. Federal Preemption of State Law Claims
Though not in a toxic-tort or mass-tort case, the United States Supreme
Court issued an opinion during the Survey period that could affect the
viability of future toxic-tort cases. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,119
the Court considered whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
112. Id. at *5.
113. 131 F. App'x 970 (5th Cir. 2000).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
115. RLI Ins. Co., 131 F. App'x at 971-72; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S.
491 (1942).
116. RLI Ins. Co., 131 F. App'x at 972; St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585 (5th Cir.
1994).
117. RLI Ins. Co., 131 F. App'x at 973.
118. Id.
119. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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denticide Act ("FIFRA") 120 pre-empted state-law tort claims.' 21 A
group of Texas peanut farmers brought claims for breach of express war-
ranty, fraud, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), strict liability, negligent testing, and negligent failure to warn
against Dow, alleging that the company's "Strongarm" pesticide severely
damaged their crops while failing to control the growth of weeds. Dow
argued that FIFRA pre-empted the state-law tort claims, 12 2 and both the
district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Dow.123
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court reversed, holding
that FIFRA did not pre-empt the plaintiffs' state-law claims. The Court
found that the plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty, violation
of Texas DTPA, strict liability, and negligent testing did not fall within the
pre-emption language and rejected the court of appeals reasoning that "a
finding of liability on these claims would 'induce Dow to alter [its] la-
bel." 124 The Court found that only the plaintiffs' "fraud and negligent-
failure-to-warn claims are premised on common-law rules that qualify as
'requirements for labeling or packaging"' and are therefore susceptible to
FIFRA preemption. 125 The Court remanded these claims for the court of
appeals to determine whether the claims imposed labeling or packaging
requirements "in addition to or different from" FIFRA's require-
ments.1 26 The Court emphasized "that a state-law labeling requirement
must in fact be equivalent to a requirement under FIFRA in order to
survive pre-emption."'127 The Court did note, however, that "[t]o survive
pre-emption, the state-law requirement need not be phrased in the identi-
cal language as its corresponding FIFRA requirement. ' 128
In reversing the lower court, the Court noted the importance of tort
litigation to environmental protection:
The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous
substances adds force to the basic presumption against pre-emption.
If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a long availa-
ble form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent
more clearly. Moreover, this history emphasizes the importance of
providing an incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in the
business of distributing inherently dangerous items. Particularly
given that Congress amended FIFRA to allow EPA to waive efficacy
review of newly registered pesticides.. . , it seems unlikely that Con-
gress considered a relatively obscure provision like § 136v(b) to give
pesticide manufacturers virtual immunity from certain forms of tort
120. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
121. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793.
122. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000) (providing that States "shall not impose or continue
in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter").
123. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793.
124. Id. at 1799 (quoting 332 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2003)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1800.
127. Id. at 1803.
128. Id. at 1804 (emphasis added).
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liability. Over-enforcement of FIFRA's misbranding prohibition
creates a risk of imposing unnecessary financial burdens on manufac-
turers; under-enforcement creates not only financial risks for con-
sumers, but risks that affect their safety and environment as well.129
Toxic-tort litigants will likely quote this language in arguing about pre-
emption in years to come.
129. Id. at 1801-02 (citations omitted).
2006] 1601
1602 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
